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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NEALY W. ADAMS, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent /Appel lee , 
Case No. 20070381-CA 
ARGUMENT 
I. DUE TO THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF HIS FORMER 
COUNSEL, ADAMS WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
CHOOSE FOR HIMSELF THE BEST DEFENSE TO ASSERT 
IN THIS CASE 
One of the critical issues in this appeal is whether 
Adams had the right to be apprised of the defense of 
voluntary intoxication. The State's appellee brief lightly 
glosses over this issue, attempting to create the appearance 
that Adams had only one viable defense to present at trial: 
the so-called UI didn't do it" defense. The State is wrong. 
From the very outset of this case, several other viable 
defenses were clearly available to Adams. Chief amongst 
those options was the possibility of asserting a diminished 
capacity defense based on voluntary intoxication.1 Yet 
^Another viable option would have been to do nothing 
more than simply put the State to its burden of proof, 
requiring the State to prove each and every element of its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt. This defense is often 
Adams was never apprised of the possibility of asserting 
this defense, because of the deficiencies of his former 
counsel. The failure by such counsel to adequately 
recognize and apprise him of his defense options was 
objectively unreasonable, falling far below applicable 
standards of competent advocacy. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 
2005 UT 62, 123 P.3d 400, 406 (u[C]ounsel should at least 
apprise the client of the options available and give advice 
based on research, experience, and sound judgment." 
(emphasis added)). Frankly, such failure by Adams' former 
counsel amounts to gross negligence. 
It cannot be disputed in this case that Adams was never 
timely apprised of the right to assert a defense of 
voluntary intoxication, either by his trial counsel or by 
his appellate counsel. The first notice that Adams ever had 
of the right to assert such a defense came six years after 
his conviction had been entered, well after his direct 
appeal remedies had been exhausted. Such was Adams' 
uncontroverted testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing herein, to wit: 
UQ. Mr. Adams, when did you first learn [of a] 
invoked with good results. 
2 
potential (inaudible) diminished capacity [defense] by 
virtue of voluntary intoxication? When did you first find 
that out? 
"A. When I first retained the firm of Morrison and 
Morrison, approximately - I saw the draft brief 
approximately, oh gosh, October of 2002. That's roughly the 
time frame. 
UQ. How many years after you were convicted? 
UA. That would have been six years, a little over six 
years. 
UQ. Prior to that time you'd never been informed that 
there was that possibility? 
"A. Never." 
R. at 765 (evidentiary Hearing transcripts at 17-18). 
Adams could not choose for himself what defense to 
assert in this case, because his former counsel never told 
him of his available options. It was his trial attorney's 
job to tell him what his options were before trial, and it 
was his appellate attorney's job to tell him what his 
options were on appeal, yet neither attorney ever fulfilled 
this critical responsibility. Neither one ever disclosed to 
Adams the option of asserting a defense of voluntary 
3 
intoxication. Hence, when Adams went to trial, he went with 
the only defense that had been presented to him, which was 
not his best defense. And when he pursued his direct appeal 
remedies, he went with the only defense that was presented 
to him, which was not his best defense on appeal. The net 
effect was the entry of a conviction against him that was 
ultimately affirmed on appeal, much to Adams' great harm and 
prejudice. 
Certainly, the post-conviction court was very concerned 
with whether Adams had ever been apprised of the defense of 
voluntary intoxication, prior to seeking post-conviction 
relief- At the evidentiary hearing below, the post-
conviction court asked pointed questions to get at a proper 
determination of this issue. For example, the court asked 
expert witness John Caine this question: 
UTHE COURT: And I assume then under your ethical 
responsibilities you are to point out the possible defenses 
that are available? 
"THE WITNESS: Absolutely." 
R. at 765 (evidentiary Hearing transcripts at 62.) 
And the post-conviction court asked counsel during 
closing argument about their respective positions regarding 
4 
the matter. (See R. at 765, evidentiary hearing transcripts 
at 109-112 and 118-20.) After considering all of the 
evidence in the case, as well as the arguments of counsel, 
the post-conviction court was left with no choice but to 
find that Adams had not been apprised of the right to assert 
a defense of voluntary intoxication by his former counsel. 
(See, e.g., Finding of Fact #21.) Yet despite reaching that 
finding, the post-conviction court shockingly concluded that 
Adams had not been deprived of effective assistance of 
counsel. It is this conclusion that is erroneous as a 
matter of law and must be overturned. 
As pointed out in our opening brief, it is the client 
who is the ultimate decisionmaker in any criminal 
proceeding, not his attorney. In the instant case, it was 
Adams who had to make the ultimate decision about what 
direction his defense would go, not his trial attorney and 
not his appellate attorney. Despite this being settled Utah 
law (see, e.g., Adams, 123 P.3d at 406; State v. Wood, 648 
P.2d 71, 92 (Utah 1982)), the State wrongfully argued before 
the post-conviction court that it was defense counsel's job 
to make the ultimate decisions in the case, not Adams. For 
example, counsel for the State argued as follows during 
5 
closing argument: 
Now I think that maybe you could say counsel 
does have the responsibility to cover all 
possible defenses with their client but the 
ultimate decision of what is to be presented to 
the jury is not the client's decision, it is 
counsel's decision because counsel is the one 
that's on the hook for that decision just like 
we've seen today... It's defense counsel's 
ultimate responsibility after consulting with 
his client to decide what defense to raise and 
in this case [trial counsel] made a reasonable 
tactical decision to assert the defense that he 
asserted. 
R. at 765 (evidentiary hearing transcripts at 120 (emphasis 
added) ) . 
The State's erroneous arguments aside, the key point is 
that Adams was the ultimate decisionmaker in this case, and 
that he was prevented from making the ultimate decisions on 
his own behalf, because he had not been adequately presented 
with his options, due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Hence, Adams' constitutionally protected right to a fair 
trial, and his constitutionally protected right to receive 
competent and effective assistance of counsel throughout the 
entirety of the underlying criminal proceedings, have been 
undermined and violated in this case. As a result, Adams is 
entitled to appropriate post-conviction relief. 
Accordingly, this Court should forthwith set aside his 
6 
conviction, and remand, the matter for a new trial . 
xx. THE ORIGINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE REPLETE 
WITH EVIDENCE OF ADAMS' CHRONIC ftI.COHOLISM 
AND DIMINISHED CAPACITY 
^ ^ r-p-tion
 iri this case but 
that Adams' problem wi\h d i cc.:o: was going to be on 
prominent . . 3 ^ ^ . s\ . r.f.eed, 
the trial transcripts of the original tri^l proceedings ire 
replete with references to Adams' cluun i p i u i > 1« iiu w i I 11 
alcoholism • . 
Below Is a chart outlining the many i nstances that 
cij,.:. : cis its profoundly 
deleterious effect: or: Adams' mental capacity 3s noted by the 
attorneys and witnesses ..-io^.: 
.STY NAME: 
1 Les Daroczi 
!j prosecutor 
ALCOHOL REFERENCE CHART 
STATEMENT/TESTIMONY: 
"It was in April that -- Virla 
Hess will tell you that it was 
in April that the relationship 
seemed to be worsening. She 
thought the defendant was 
drinking more." 
REFERENCE: 
T.T., vol 
, , a. 
! „ —, 1 
7 
1 ALCOHOL REFERENCE CHART || 
Les Daroczi 
(prosecutor) 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
"And, also, there was an 
incident with a -- with Virla 
being awakened by the sound of 
breaking glass, and when she 
woke up to see what it was, the 
defendant was coming out of 
Carleen's room and was 
intoxicated and -- and didn't 
have pants on." 
XXQ. All right. Was there a 
time that you -- some time this 
year in x95 that you and the 
defendant begin to -- you begin 
to have a more stormy 
relationship? 
"A. Around December he started I 
drinking real heavy and --
"Q. You are talking about this 
year? 
"A. Yes. 
UQ. Okay. 
"A. And he was --he just 
wasn't hisself (sic)." 
"He'd just sit there and drink. 
Sometimes he'd -- I'd have to 
help him into the bed." 
UA. And when Wayne came in that 
night, why, he'd been drinking 
and he was real ignorant, and 
he just wasn't hisself (sic)." 
UQ. Okay. So what happened? 
UA. Nothing really that night, 
other than he drank --
"Q. Okay. 
nA. -- all night long. He was 
really drunk when he went to 
bed." 
T.T., vol. 
I, at 16 
[R. at 074] 
T.T., vol. 
I, at 46 
[R. at 074] 
T.T., vol. 
I, at 47 
[R. at 074] 
T.T., vol. 
1/ at 48 
[R. at 074] 
T.T., vol. 
I, at 48-49 
[R. at 074] 
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ALCOHOL REFERENCE CHART 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
UA. ... And we more or less 
argued until I went to bed. He 
was drunk. He just kept 
drinking. And it was my 
understanding that when I went 
to work Monday, which was the 
24th, that when I come home 
from work at three o'clock : 
Monday, he was going to be 
gone. But when I got home, he 
was laying on the couch 
sleeping off a drunk." 
T.T 
I 
vol. 
at 51 
[R. at 0 74] 
XXA. So I left him alone and 
then when he woke up, I asked 
him what -- what he was going 
t : • do. And he says: What do 
yc "a. mean? And he starts in 
drinking again • '• 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
Virla Hess 
vwitness) 
.irla Hess 
(witness) 
VkQ. Was there a time that there 
was -- you were awakened prior 
to the breaking up by the sour 
of glass breaking? 
"A. Yes. 
V Q . T e l l L;„;L -12 j a L J i l t Ll'ld I . 
UA. It was -- it was on a 
;;urday night. Wayne had be-
i I i inking really heavy. " 
at 55 
"Q. Oka; 
UA. I go .:: < the bathroom an 
I ask himi What's going on? 
"Q. And he's sitting there on 
the toilet. Well, where, am I 
What am I doing? I finally g: 
hirr --*-- h^i." 
"Q. Now, isn't it correct thai 
you and Wayne had been --
Wayne, you indicated, was not 
happy? 
"A. That's what he'd sa, '-lit-n 
he was drunk, yes. 
"Q. And he'd -- he'd starting 
drinking a lot, lot more as 
time went on after December, i. 
that correct? 
"A. Yes." 
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1 ALCOHOL REFERENCE CHART || 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
"Q. Okay. Would you start with 
that paragraph and read it on 
down to where the -- through 
the yellow underlining? 
"A. x0n the 22nd of April, 
Wayne had been gone all day and 
when he came home, he was 
pretty much drunk. And he 
said, what are you going to do 
if I leave? And I told him 
nobody was keeping him there, 
the door -- there was the door, 
to leave. He just kept on all 
night.'" 
UQ. Isn't it correct Carleen 
will tell you -- well, let me -
- that's -- during this period, 
Wayne was drinking quite 
heavily? 
MA. Yes, he was. 
"Q. To the point of, as you 
indicated on this night, not 
really understanding where he 
was or what he was doing? 
X\A. He done that quite a bit. 
He'd sit there and drink until 
he didn't know who he was, 
where he was. I came home one 
night to pick up my car after 
he had it. He was sitting 
behind the chair in a fetal 
position. He doesn't know 
where he is, who he is." 
UQ. And that's kind of how he 
appeared that night? 
"A. He was drunk. 
UQ. Okay. He was drunk when 
you went to bed and --
"A. Yes --
AXQ. -- still drinking? 
UA. -- and he was still 
drinking when I went to bed." 
"A. I didn't know what was 
going on. I asked Wayne and he 
told me he didn't even know 
where he was. Right to this 
day, I don't know what went 
on." 
T.T., vol. 
I, at 61 
[R. at 074] 
T.T., vol. 
I, at 102 
[R. at 074] 
T.T., vol. 
I, at 102 
[R. at 074] 
T.T., vol. 
I, at 104 
[R. at 074] 
J H 
10 
I ALCOHOL REFERENCE CHART || 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
Virla Hess 
(witness) 
Virla Hess ' 
(witness) 
Nealy W. Adams 
(defendant) 
Nealy W. Adams 
(defendant) 
UA. Carleen wouldn't say 
anything. Not that night, no. 
Carleen would not say anything. 
She just threw his shirt out 
and said it was his shirt. And 
I know Wayne came out of the 
bedroom, went in and sat on the 
toilet. The pants were on the 
floor and he was absolutely 
naked. But he was drunk, too. 
"Q. Yes, he was drunk. 
UA. Yeah, he was." 
UA. He had been drinking, yes." 
XXQ. Okay. He was there when 
you got home on the 24th; is 
that correct? 
"A. Yes, he was asleep on the 
couch, sleeping off a drunk." 
"Q. When did you first meet 
Virla Hess. 
UA. Approximately the latter 
part of August of 1993. 
UQ. And where did you meet her 
at? 
"A. The American Legion Post 
XVQ. Were you drinking then? 
UA. Yes, I was. 
UQ. Was she drinking? 
"A. Yes, she was. 
UQ. She knew you drank 
regularly? 
UA. Yes, she did." 
UQ. The incident that has been 
testified to concerning the 
breaking of the clock, had you 
been drinking that night? 
"A. Yes, I had. 
UQ. Do you recall the incident 
at all? 
UA. No, I do not." 
T.T., vol. 
I, at 105 
[R. at 074] 
T.T., vol. 
II, at 34 
[R. at 074] 
T.T., vol. 
II, at 36 
[R. at 074] 
T.T., vol. 
Ill, at 6-7 
[R. at 074] 
T.T., vol. 
Ill, at 15 
[R. at 074] 
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1 ALCOHOL REFERENCE CHART || 
Nealy W. Adams 
(defendant) 
Nealy W. Adams 
(defendant) 
"Q. (By Mr. Daroczi) Were there 
times when -- when after --
after drinking you would the 
next day not recall what 
happened after -- what happened 
while you had been under the 
influence of alcohol? 
"A. There was some times, yes. 
"Q. Okay. Just like -- like 
the incident you recall about 
the clock being broken and you 
coming out of her room? You 
don't dispute that that 
happened? 
UA. I dispute remembering it." 
UQ. Okay. Because there were 
times when -- other times when 
you had been drinking and not 
remember what you had done 
! after -- under the influence of 
alcohol; is that correct? 
UA. I could remember Virla 
helping me into the --to bed. 
UQ. Well, no. no. I'm -- yes, 
and we've covered that. And 
like you said, there were other 
incidents where you wouldn't 
remember what you had done 
under the influence of alcohol 
the next day. 
UA. There were some times." 
T.T., vol. 
Ill, at 18 
[R. at 074] 
T.T., vol. 
Ill, at 18 
[R. at 074] 
J 1 
Again, the question must be asked: should Adams' trial 
counsel have foreseen how prominent the alcohol issue was 
going to be at trial? Of course he should have. It was his 
obligation to foresee this. He was on notice that it was 
going to be featured as a prominent part of the case. From 
the discovery in this case, he was on notice that it was 
going to play a large role at trial. It was prominently 
12 
featured in the two preliminary hearings conducted in this 
matter, and it was prominently featured in the police 
reports and discovery material that was on file and made 
available to counsel. (See R. at 765, evidentiary hearing 
transcripts at 30-31; see also R. at 074, Trial Transcripts, 
vol. I, at 61.) 
Moreover, trial counsel was fully aware of Adams' 
alcohol tendencies, as counsel was a recovering alcoholic 
himself, and Adams often smelled of alcohol when the two met 
to prepare the case in advance of trial. (R. at 7 65, 
evidentiary hearing transcripts at 12-13, 2 0.) At a 
minimum, Adams' smell of alcohol should have been a major 
signal to trial counsel that his client had a chronic 
alcohol problem, which could have been utilized 
advantageously by asserting it as an affirmative defense. 
As it turned out, Adams' chronic alcohol problem was 
not only a featured aspect at trial, but it was also a 
featured aspect of Adams' appeal. Indeed, the two appellate 
court opinions issued as part of Adams' direct appeal make 
multiple references to Adams' chronic alcohol problem. See, 
e.g., State v. Adams, 955 P.2d 781, 782-83 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998); State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 642, 644 (Utah 2000). Yet 
13 
unfortunately for Adams, this issue was neither discussed 
nor portrayed in a light that would have been positively 
helpful to him, in terms of considering it as a potential 
defense. Instead, it was presented in a starkly negative 
light, with Adams being painted as a bumbling drunk who 
probably deserved to be convicted of some violation of the 
penal code. 
Suffice it to say that Adams' severe alcohol problem 
(marked by major episodes of binge drinking, blackouts, and 
complete memory loss) was a key part of the criminal 
proceedings below, both before, during, and after Adams' 
trial. Regrettably, Adams' former counsel failed to 
appreciate its significance, and failed to ever timely 
assert it as a defense. As a result, Adams had a conviction 
entered against him that was the direct and proximate result 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his 
state and federal constitutional rights. Inasmuch as Adams 
did not receive effective assistance of counsel in the 
underlying proceedings below, his conviction cannot stand, 
and must now be set aside. This Court should not 
countenance any further deprivation of Adams' constitutional 
rights. Instead, it should forthwith reverse the post-
14 
conviction court's decision, and remand this matter for a 
new trial. 
III. A VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION DEFENSE WAS NOT 
INCONSISTENT WITH AN "I DIDN'T DO IT" DEFENSE 
Another important question in this appeal is this: 
could Adams have relied on both an UI didn't do it" defense, 
as well as a voluntary intoxication defense at trial? 
Absolutely. He could have relied on both of these defenses 
below, without any inconsistency in his position. The 
option was certainly available to him to invoke an UI didn't 
do it" defense in response to the rape count, while 
simultaneously relying on a voluntary intoxication defense 
in response to the forcible sexual abuse count. There would 
have been no inconsistency in this approach, provided that 
his trial counsel competently performed his professional 
duties in this case by timely asserting the defense, by 
retaining an expert witness to adequately support it, and by 
carefully preparing Adams' testimony at trial, in the event 
Adams needed to testify. (R. at 7 65, evidentiary hearing 
transcripts at 50-53, 55, 59-61.) 
In terms of contesting the rape count, trial counsel 
frankly did not have an overly difficult task. Admittedly, 
15 
this count was the more serious of the two counts that were 
pending against Adams, yet it was also considerably weaker 
in terms of evidentiary support. Indeed, reasonable doubt 
was everywhere to be found in challenging the rape count, as 
even the State's own medical expert in the case concluded 
that Carleen Hess--the accuser herein--was virginal in her 
sexual make up, finding no evidence of intercourse and no 
evidence of any kind of physical or sexual abuse. (R. at 
074 (T.T., vol. II, at 5-7),) Moreover, Carleen's own 
testimony was, while no doubt sympathetic, not overly strong 
and at times extremely difficult to follow. Such testimony 
proved to be ambiguous, contradictory, vague, and 
inconsistent. Again, it should not be forgotten that such 
testimony was improperly bolstered by other witnesses at 
trial, as noted by both this Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court on direct appeal. Adams, 955 P.2d at 786; Adams, 5 
P.3d at 647-48. 
All things considered, there was only a remote 
likelihood that Adams would be convicted of the rape count 
at trial, and he was in fact rightfully acquitted of it. 
Unfortunately, his trial attorney failed to give the jury an 
opportunity to consider Adams' best defense to the forcible 
16 
sexual abuse count, i.e., the defense of voluntary 
intoxication. Indeed, trial counsel gave the jury almost 
nothing to consider in terms of defeating this count. It 
should come as no surprise, then, that Adams was convicted 
of this charge, due in large part to grossly ineffective 
advocacy by his trial counsel. 
The essential point is that Adams very well could have 
relied on a voluntary intoxication defense at trial, 
interposing it as a defense to the sexual abuse count, while 
simultaneously relying on an UI didn't do it" defense with 
respect to the rape count. These were not inconsistent 
defenses. The only problem is that his trial counsel failed 
to competently appreciate the viability of utilizing a 
voluntary intoxication defense. This blatant mistake was 
unfortunately repeated on appeal, much to Adams' great 
detriment. 
In short, Adams could have (and, according to defense 
expert John Caine, should have) legitimately invoked a 
voluntary intoxication defense in this case, but he was 
prevented from doing so because he was never even told of 
the right to invoke it. Because Adams' former counsel 
failed to competently apprise Adams of his available defense 
17 
options in this case, Adams has received grossly ineffective 
of counsel. The proper remedy is to afford Adams a new 
trial, in order to ensure a fair and just outcome in this 
case, and to ensure that Adams' constitutional right to 
receive effective assistance of counsel is upheld. See 
State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321 (Utah 2007) (vacating 
defendant's conviction and awarding new trial where 
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel); State 
v. Thomas, 743 P.2d 816 (Wash. 1987) (same); State v. 
Tilton, 72 P.3d 735 (Wash. 2003). 
IV. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE WERE MULTIPLE 
INSTANCES OF ABUSE IS ERRONEOUS 
The State continues to argue in this case that there 
were multiple instances of abuse, not a single episode. 
Hence, the argument goes, Adams would not have been able to 
invoke a voluntary intoxication defense at trial without 
showing that he was intoxicated on each of the alleged 
"multiple" instances of abuse. The State's position is 
untenable. 
At trial, the State did not establish multiple 
instances of abuse. Again, it must be kept in mind that 
only a single count of forcible sexual was charged in the 
18 
information (not multiple counts), and only a single count 
was set forth in the jury instructions. Simply put, the 
State's argument that there were multiple instances of abuse 
is a red herring. Since this issue has already been 
adequately covered in Adams' appellant brief (see Brief at 
41-44), it need not be further addressed herein. 
V. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT'S DECISION TO OVERRULE 
ADAMS7 WELL-TAKEN OBJECTIONS TO THE STATE'S 
PROPOSED ORDER SHOWS THAT THE COURT MECHANICALLY 
ADOPTED THAT ORDER, SURRENDERING AN IMPORTANT 
JUDICIAL FUNCTION TO ADAMS' OPPONENT 
Finally, it is necessary to revisit the issue of the 
post-conviction court's decision to adopt the State's 
proposed Order without revision. With all due respect to 
the post-conviction court, surely one of many objections 
that Adams raised in opposition to the State's proposed 
Order had merit. If indeed only one objection had merit, 
then at a minimum the post-conviction court should have 
sustained that objection, rather than completely overruling 
the entirety of Adams' objections. 
By overruling all of Adams' objections, and by entering 
the State's proposed order without revision, the post-
conviction court clearly gave the impression to Adams that 
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it was uninterested in hearing from him, and that it was 
simply going to adopt his opponent's order notwithstanding 
any valid objection to the same. In other words, the post-
conviction court clearly gave Adams' the impression that it 
was mechanically adopting the State's proposed order, 
thereby surrendering an important judicial role to Adams' 
opponent. 
There is good reason why Utah law adheres to the 
longstanding policy of disapproving a trial court's 
mechanical adoption of a party's proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order. See Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 
567 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977). Underpinning that policy 
is the need for courts to independently reach their own 
rationale and analysis for resolving the issues in 
controversy. For a trial court to turn over this important 
task to one of the litigants in a case is to surrender a 
nondelegable core judicial function. 
The State is treating this issue as unimportant. It is 
not unimportant. Adams' objections to the State's proposed 
order were well-taken, and should not have been summarily 
overruled. To the extent that this Court determines that 
the post-conviction court mechanically adopted the State's 
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proposed order without proper cause, then Adams is entitled 
to appropriate relief, such as the entry of an order that 
accurately reflects the post-conviction court's own 
independent analysis and conclusions, not the analysis and 
conclusions advocated by the State. 
CONCLUSION; 
Adams has now spent more than 12 years serving a 
sentence on a conviction that quite likely would not have 
been entered against him had his former counsel adequately 
fulfilled their duties and responsibilities in this case by 
rendering effective assistance of counsel. It was below an 
objective standard of reasonableness for Adams' former 
counsel to fail to appreciate the significance of Adams' 
chronic alcohol problem. It was below an objective standard 
of reasonableness for Adams' former counsel to fail to 
appreciate the significance of utilizing a voluntary 
intoxication defense at trial and on appeal. And it was way 
below an objective standard of reasonableness for Adams' 
former counsel to fail to ever apprise Adams of his right to 
rely upon a defense of voluntary intoxication. All of these 
deficiencies combined must inexorably lead to the conclusion 
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that Adams has been deprived of effective assistance of 
counsel. 
Justice now demands that Adams' wrongful conviction be 
set aside. This Court should vacate the conviction, and in 
so doing afford Adams a new trial, wherein his 
constitutional right to receive effective assistance of 
counsel is recognized, protected, and upheld- In the 
interest of justice, this Court should therefore reverse the 
decision of the post-conviction court, set aside Adams' 
conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial. 
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